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Money Laundering and the Shadow Economy in Kazakhstan 
Introduction 
The criminalisation of money laundering has emerged to become a new norm of 
international law and a core component of the governance of the world economy 
during the last twenty years. This development was given added impetus following 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and subsequent attacks in the UK and Europe, 
since when the focus of money laundering measures has been redirected towards 
the financing of terrorist activities (Alldridge 2008; Levi 2002). It remains a key area 
of negotiation between the nations of the West and those of the developing world, 
and has prompted a significant degree of harmonisation between national 
jurisdictions, as well as points of difference in policy and practice. And while public 
and political concern over the threat posed by the illicit legalisation of criminal assets 
remains significant, there are areas of uncertainty around this issue which impact in 
particular on developing nations. In particular, it has proved difficult to clearly define 
the social and economic rationale for the legal control of money laundering in these 
jurisdictions.  
The movement from an economic rationale, which legitimises the control of all 
laundered money, to a crime rationale, which emphasises the control only of the 
proceeds of certain high-risk areas of criminality, arguably results in a ‘blanket’ 
approach to criminalisation that can fail to address the local concerns of developing 
countries. There are significant financial costs associated with the control of money 
laundering, associated with both the costs to government of establishing the national 
and international organizations needed to fight it, and with the compliance costs that 
accrue to businesses and entrepreneurs who are subject to these controls (Geiger 
and Wuensch 2007; Harvey 2004; Reuter and Truman 2004). In particular, these 
costs are problematic for developing nations to bear, being almost as great as the 
direct costs associated with the fight against illegal enterprise and smuggling. 
Despite this, action to combat money laundering remains necessary due to the 
facilitative effect that those proceeds have in terms of organised criminality (Levi 
2002: 183-4). An examination of the circumstances surrounding the introduction of 
money laundering controls in one developing country, Kazakhstan, will highlight 
some of the problems with, and alternatives to, the blanket criminalisation of money 
laundering activities. Experience in Kazakhstan suggests that approaches such as 
an ‘amnesty’ on some forms of illegally-acquired capital can offset some of the 
potentially negative effects of money laundering, allowing for the root causes of the 
problem, namely predicate offending, to be tackled with more energy and resource.  
The Wider Context of Money Laundering Controls 
The international money laundering control system has its modern antecedents1 in 
the early efforts at national controls instituted in the USA by the Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970 (Levi and Reuter 2006: 296), and elsewhere. The 1970 Act required that all US 
banks provide a report to the Treasury on all financial transactions conducted in cash 
and exceeding $10,000 USD in value. This was a regulatory measure designed to 
prevent tax evasion; as such, the rationale behind its introduction was primarily 
economic in nature and so the law sought to control the effects of illicit money rather 
than the conduct that generated it. And this outlook informed the approach taken by 
the emergent international money laundering control system, in the form of the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), established in July 1989 
at the G-7 Paris Economic Forum. This body assesses the effectiveness of national 
money laundering controls, and establishes model legislation and standards for its 
members.2 Official statements made by FATF about the rationale underpinning the 
money laundering agenda have emphasised the corrosive effects of the proceeds of 
money laundering upon developing and established economies (FATF 2011: 9-10; 
Alldridge 2008), and so roots the new regulatory system in the need to control 
‘threats to the integrity of the international financial system’.3 The FATF’s emphasis 
on economic harm also reflects concerns over the social effects of money laundering 
on GDP, standards of living, and mortality and literacy rates (FATF 2011: 9).  
The problem is that this rationale remains both empirically uncertain (Cuéllar 2003; 
Levi and Reuter 2006) and politically questionable; anti-money laundering policies 
arguably involve developed economies imposing restrictive controls onto developing 
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 Older precedents can be traced back to the actions of Chinese traders in concealing assets several 
thousand years ago (Seagrave 1995), and to the American mafia’s legitimization of the proceeds of 
the illicit alcohol trade during the prohibition era (Haller 1990; Levi and Reuter 2006). 
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 Currently, the FATF has a membership consisting of 34 national governments and two regional 
organisations (the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council). A number of organisations also have 
observer status, such as the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the World Bank. 
3
 See www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ and www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/faq/moneylaundering/  
ones in a manner which is ‘empirically dubious, over-inclusive, and paternalistic’ 
(Alldridge 2008: 447), and which can place additional financial limits onto developing 
economies already damaged by the movement of assets into the illicit economy in 
the first place. By emphasising the consequences of illicit financial practices, this 
approach treats all laundered money in the same way regardless of origin, and thus 
leads to enforcement approaches that emphasise procedural compliance and cast 
the net of monitoring and control widely, placing significant burdens onto national 
enforcement and implementation bodies; the cost of the anti-money laundering 
regime in the USA alone was estimated in 2003 at around $7 billion USD (Reuter 
and Truman 2004). It is also entirely legitimate to query whether the funds that are 
being laundered would still merit criminalisation if they were being used in such a 
way as to produce more good than harm? Might it not make sense to permit a flow of 
money into a national economic system if such a measure would assist in state 
restructuring and lead to better social outcomes? 
This economic rationale has also been undermined by the subsequent shift in 
attention on the part of national and international enforcement and money laundering 
control regimes, away from a regulatory approach to finance and towards the 
policing of financial activities which are prioritised not for their macro-economic 
impact, but because they relate to socially dangerous criminal activities that 
constitute political problems for Western governments (Garland 2001; Simon 2007). 
By the mid-1980s, the ‘war on drugs’ in the USA had refocused money laundering 
controls onto tackling the processing of cash derived from drug dealing and 
smuggling (Levi 2002: 186; Levi and Reuter 2006: 296); ‘following the money’ was 
seen as an effective way to disrupt these criminal activities. This focus on drug 
proceeds can be seen at an international level in the terms of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
1988 (the Vienna Convention). Similarly, the post-9/11 era has seen a new emphasis 
on terrorist financing, in order to both limit the capacity of terrorists to act and to 
inculpate those who support or facilitate that action (Levi and Gilmore 2002).  
The systems of control over money laundering that have emerged in the majority of 
countries since then have focused on the legalization of money and property 
acquired through an ever-widening array of predicate crimes; the FATF’s core 
recommendation in this area is that ‘[C]ountries should apply the crime of money 
laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of 
predicate offences’ (FATF 2012: 34). This creates an extended international 
mechanism of crime control which serves two purposes; the prevention of criminal 
activity via indirect enforcement (particularly in areas where direct enforcement is 
difficult), and the regulation of the internal integrity of the market. The former 
rationale reflects the growth of pluralised, partnership-oriented, devolved models of 
crime control (Garland 2001), and explains the emphasis on including all serious 
predicate offences; the latter explains the imposition of restrictive technical 
requirements (such as customer due diligence) and systems of reporting that apply 
to all forms of transaction, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or illegal, in order to 
establish ground-rules for entry and activity in the marketplace (Braithwaite 2008). 
Both sides of this coin are ‘intended to limit criminal access to the financial system’ 
(Levi and Reuter 2006: 297).  
The global system of standard-setting and monitoring ensures that emergent 
markets are secure arenas for investment and commercial activity; in this sense, it is 
an engine of globalisation (Alldridge 2008). National governments have moved away 
from traditional law-enforcement structures as a way of fulfilling these roles, and 
towards the institution of systems of monitoring that incorporate analytical 
methodologies and financial intelligence as means of monitoring financial flows and 
identifying assets linked to crime. This is facilitated via the establishment of state-
level financial monitoring institutions such as the USA’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an agency within the Department of Treasury, and 
the political leverage applied by supranational organisations like FATF. This 
organisation compiled an annual ‘blacklist’ of countries that were not conducting 
sufficiently comprehensive measures to prevent the laundering of criminal assets. 
This led to the international dissemination of an inclusive model of money laundering 
which encompasses many forms of financial activity, and does not necessarily limit 
itself to any particular manifestations of predicate offending. This can be intrusive 
and distort state sovereignty and state-individual relations (Alldridge 2008; Levi and 
Reuter 2006). Methods of fighting money laundering often conflict with generally 
accepted legal principles such as the presumption of innocence and banking 
secrecy. Little remains known about the effectiveness of this system, or about the 
scale of the problem that it seeks to address. 
All of these consequences are tolerable so long as there is an understanding that the 
system works in the interests of the societies within which it applies; that it is 
reducing the ability of criminal actors to engage in the illegal, harmful activities that 
give rise to illicit funds, and that it is improving the capacity of national economic 
systems to deliver benefits to citizens (via security, stability, and wealth). The 
problem comes when it is applied in the context of a society where the sheer extent 
of the illicit economy is so great that the national economy is seriously compromised. 
A country that is in this position might benefit from the development of laws to 
prevent the distortion of the economy, and thus acquire the legitimacy required in 
order to play a part in the world market. But establishing rigid firewalls against the 
legalization of illicit property while it constitutes a large proportion of the national 
economy may narrow that country’s capacity to redevelop its economic system. As 
such, there is a case for augmenting the use of criminalising anti-money laundering 
measures with other approaches so that the restrictiveness of the former acts to the 
benefit, and not the detriment, of the national economic system. This case will be 
demonstrated via reference to one particular national jurisdiction, Kazakhstan. 
The Shadow Economy in the Republics of the former Soviet Union 
After the collapse of the USSR and Europe’s Eastern Bloc in the early 1990s, the 
newly independent Republics faced many tasks of infrastructure reconstruction and 
social modernisation. This included legal redevelopment, as these new States 
required legal systems that could address the realities of the modern international 
community, the creation of which would benefit from the accrued experience of more 
established western legal systems. In countries such as Kazakhstan, the desire to 
learn and adopt from abroad was explicit: ‘[R]esolving these issues is not possible 
without basic research which, in turn, requires a[n]...appeal to foreign experience of 
legal construction, which has proved its effectiveness and viability, with a view to its 
possible borrowing’ (Dzhekebaev 2001: 3). The reform of domestic legislation to fit a 
‘western-style’ model was undertaken, along with the adoption of the legislative 
practices of overseas legal institutions and the introduction of new regulations into 
newly-reconstructed areas of social life. In many cases, in countries like Kazakhstan, 
this was done before the problems the law was intended to address had been fully 
experienced, in order to ensure compliance with international requirements. While 
the development of new legislative frameworks in countries like Kazakhstan was 
achieved with some success, there were areas, such as money laundering law, 
where social structures were simply not ready to implement the necessary changes.  
Bringing Kazakh domestic money laundering laws into compliance with international 
legal standards involved the introduction, via the new Criminal Code of Kazakhstan 
in 1997, of new offences to control the flow of assets in the private economic sphere. 
Not only did no criminal offences of this type exist prior to this time, but the 
bureaucratic, centrally-managed command-control economy of the Soviet era, 
coupled with the prevailing collectivist cultural and legal traditions of the region (Kim 
and Pridemore 2006; Nichols 2001: 912; Olcott 2010: 60), meant that there was little 
experience or capacity to underpin the regulation of private economic transactions 
(Eilat and Zinnes 2002: 1236). Like elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (Holmes 
2009: 270; Kim and Pridemore 2005; 2006), the post-transition period in Kazakhstan 
saw an upsurge in acquisitive offending as the economic system was restructured 
along free-market lines, a process pursued more aggressively here than elsewhere 
(Alam and Banerji 2000). Kazakhstan was propelled swiftly into independence, with 
little time for preparation (Olcott 2010: 16); the changing social, institutional and legal 
structures of this period created ‘institutional vacuums’ in the new systems of 
regulation which private actors were able to capitalise on in order to withdraw large 
sums of money and property from the legitimate economy (Holmes 2009; Iwasaki 
and Suzuki 2007: 400-1; Nichols 2001: 908-10). At the same time, a population that 
had suffered many years of material deprivation under communism was suddenly 
presented with opportunities to acquire material wealth, and a shift away from the 
certainties of the communist era allowed for a new moral ideology of personal 
enrichment at all costs to flourish (Olcott 2010: 60). Economic redevelopment, social-
structural change, and rapid privatisation created structural gaps in regulatory 
systems that allow the shadow economy to develop (Eilat and Zinnes 2002: 1236) as 
an endemic feature of the new market system from the outset. 
The result of these transitional difficulties was the development of a large, 
entrenched, shadow economy in emergent post-Soviet nations like Kazakhstan. 
While difficulties remain in accurately determining the parameters of the shadow 
economy, some key elements have been identified: 1) the informal economy, 
including the otherwise legal proceeds of the supply of goods and services which are 
concealed for taxation purposes and so not recorded in official statistics; 2) the 
unregulated economy, including the proceeds of activities that bypass reporting, 
licensing, or other official requirements; 3) the fictitious economy, including the non-
declarable proceeds of offences such as theft, bribery, and fraud related to the 
receipt and transfer of money; and 4) the underground economy, including the 
economic proceeds of criminal activities prohibited by the law, such as drug and 
weapon smuggling (Eilat and Zinnes 2002; Schneider and Enste 2000). The unifying 
definitional feature is that all of these activities are outside the scope of the taxation 
and budgetary systems, and thus do not feature in the GDP figures for the national 
economy. As such, the shadow economy is broader in scope than simply the income 
derived from the kinds of criminal activity that the international money laundering 
system has prioritised.  
A five-step model for this process of development in Kazakhstan has been 
suggested (Darimbetov and Spanov 2001), beginning with an emergent conflict 
during the mid-1980s between a new business sector and government agencies 
over reform of the latter’s monopolistic economic controls. Second, between 1989 
and 1992, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the government lost control of state-
subsidised industries as its economic management capacity was reduced; private 
and criminal enterprises were able to acquire control of these industries and their 
assets cheaply. Third, after independence in 1993, this process of privatization, 
which had been unofficial, became a formal policy process, accelerating the passing 
of former public assets into private (and/or clandestine) hands (Olcott 2010: 135). 
Fourth, between 1993 and 1998, this illegally acquired wealth began to filter back 
into the legitimate economy in the form of foreign capital investment, assisted by a 
sharply rise in corruption in the public sector. Finally, since 1999, Kazakhstan has 
seen both the creation of the preconditions for legitimate economic growth, and the 
expansion of the shadow economy via smuggling, organised crime, and double-entry 
bookkeeping within industry, prompting the development of measures to address the 
issue of illegitimate capital (Darimbetov and Spanov 2001: 46-7).  
The effects of this shadow economy can be seen in almost all spheres of society 
(Nichols 2001). In the late 1990s, the annual volume of shadow capital transaction 
within Kazakhstan was estimated at $6-7 billion dollars, involving up to 15% of the 
economically active population of the country in activities that bypass the taxation, 
budgetary, and social security systems of the state (Kulekeev 1997). Eilat and 
Zinnes (2002: 1239) estimated the shadow economy of Kazakhstan to be equivalent 
to 27% of national GDP, while Schneider (2003: 27) put this at 42.2% in 2001, 
occupying 34% of the working-age labour force. Government sources in Kazakhstan 
estimate that the share of shadow economy in Kazakhstan over the ten years has 
decreased from 30 to 20 per cent of GDP, equivalent to 35 trillion4 Kazakh tenge 
(KZT), or $5 billion USD. As such, the legalisation of illicit capital is a more pervasive 
issue in Kazakhstan than might be the case in western countries as it encompasses 
such a large amount of illicit commercial activity (and proceeds stemming from fraud 
and the abuse of positions of public authority) in addition to the proceeds of crimes 
like drug smuggling. And so while international efforts at money laundering control 
have focused on the latter (Levi and Gilmore 2002), in a country like Kazakhstan, the 
issue is not simply one of crime control, but also one of reconstituting the market and 
reclaiming a large proportion of the economic activity of the nation. As such, it may 
be argued that overtly criminalising approach to money laundering control may 
address only one part of a much larger problem; there is room for the pursuit of 
‘market-constituting’ (Braithwaite 2008) strategies alongside this crime-control 
paradigm. 
Kazakhstan's response to money laundering (I): Criminalisation 
Many different steps have been taken by the government of Kazakhstan to tackle the 
shadow economy by enhancing the attractiveness of legitimate business activity, 
including the simplification of the procedures for the registration of natural persons 
and legal entities for business purposes, and the reform of the tax system and the 
reduction of regulatory burdens. Along with the general improvement of the climate 
for law-abiding business in the country, a key role has been played by law reforms 
which aimed to criminalise money laundering. Central to this was the adoption of the 
new Criminal Code of Kazakhstan on July 16, 1997, which fundamentally differed 
from the old 1959 Code of the Kazakh SSR. This previous legislation did not meet 
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the requirements of the modern international community in terms of criminalising 
harmful commercial conduct; the new Criminal Code addressed money laundering 
issues, as well as providing a more structured legal framework that reflected the 
values enshrined in the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan (Dzhekebaev 2001). Its 
provisions came into force on January 1, 1998. 
Section 193 of the Criminal Code sets out the basis of criminal responsibility for the 
legalization of illicit income, making it an offence to engage in: ‘[t]he performance of 
financial transactions and other transactions with monetary funds or other property 
acquired by illegal means, as well as the use of such funds or other property for 
entrepreneurial or other economic activity’. The offence encompasses a wide range 
of asset transfers which might provide a route to the legitimisation of illegally-
acquired assets, and so fulfils the international requirements laid down in the UN 
Convention for the Suppression of the Terrorism Financing of 1999. The terms of this 
offence were significantly broader than the laws of most other national jurisdictions, 
in that the term ‘illegal’ used here was capable of including the proceeds of 
administrative offences and civil wrongs as well as the proceeds of crime per se. 
This meant that Kazakh law was not compliant with wider international standards. 
However, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan issued a Normative 
Resolution on June 18, 2004 which specified that ‘[t]he grounds of criminal 
responsibility according to Article 193 of the Criminal Code is the legalization of 
money or other property derived only from illegal activities (smuggling, weapon 
trafficking, drugs, embezzlement, tax evasion, etc.)’ (para. 10). By defining the 
predicate basis of money laundering liability in this way, the Supreme Court of 
Kazakhstan interpreted domestic law so as to conform to the narrower approach 
taken in international legal instruments, limiting the scope of inquiry to the proceeds 
of ‘core’ offences. 
As well as defining the terms of the offence, the second and third elements of Article 
193 proscribes a maximum penalty for its breach of up to three years imprisonment, 
and set out two categories of aggravating features which exacerbate the seriousness 
of the offence. The lesser category includes offences that are committed: a) by a 
group of persons by prior agreement; b) more than once; and c) by a person using 
their official position. The more serious category includes offences committed: a) by 
a person authorized to perform public functions, if they involve the use of his official 
position; b) by an organized group; and c) by a large-scale criminal organization. 
While there is no minimum threshold in terms of the amount of laundered money that 
must be involved in order to lead to criminal liability, the involvement of a sum 
greater than ten thousand times the monthly specified index rate5 (approximately 
$100,000 USD) will lead to an aggravated form of liability carrying a maximum 
penalty of seven years imprisonment. This initial process of criminalisation was not 
wholly effective; Article 193 has been characterised as constituting ‘empty’ legislation 
(Tang and Ai 2010: 216) on the basis of a practical lack of commitment to 
implementation, and the lack of a financial intelligence unit to coordinate this 
process. Further, the IMF in 2004 observed that, while positive progress had been 
made towards reform of the financial sector in relation to money laundering, the 
existing legal framework did not meet international standards (IMF 2004: 21).  
Effective compliance with FATF and other international recommendations required 
further reform, and this came in the form of a subsequent Act of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan ‘On counteracting the legalization (laundering) of illegally funds, and 
financing terrorism’, adopted on August 28, 2009 and implemented on March 9, 
2010. This Act was intended to define the legal basis of state efforts to counteract 
the laundering of the proceeds of crime and the role of non-state entities in financial 
monitoring. It specifies the range of private bodies that must engage in monitoring 
processes (Art. 3), and the nature of the transactions that must be monitored, 
including many of the generally-recognised phenomena associated with money-
laundering (Art. 4); this includes both transactions defined as ‘suspicious’, but also all 
financial transactions of certain forms above a threshold value level. It sets out the 
due diligence requirements (Arts. 5-9) and recordkeeping and internal controls 
required (Arts. 10-12), and the reporting mechanisms for the notification and non-
processing of suspicious transactions (Arts. 13-14). Finally, it sets out the 
responsibilities of an Authorized Body (Arts. 16-18) which will coordinate and lead 
the national efforts at money laundering control (this role is fulfilled by the Financial 
Monitoring Committee of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan). This 
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 The monthly index rate is a ratio, set with reference to the annual budget, for the calculation of 
penalties, taxes and other charges in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
Currently, the monthly index is 1618 KZT (approximately $10.79 USD). As such, the aggravating level 
specified by Article 193 is equivalent to 16.18 million KZT ($107,900 USD). In November 2011 this 
level was adjusted to 20,000 times the monthly index rate. 
legislation brought Kazakh law broadly into line with international requirements, 
although some areas of concern remain, such as the manageability of the non-
suspicious transaction reporting rules, and the suitability of having the Authorized 
Body located within the Ministry of Finance. In terms of enforcement, in the first 
seven years of the anti-money laundering regime, only fifty cases were ever 
registered; between 2006 and 2011, this increased to 531 cases registered. 
Kazakhstan's response to money laundering (II): Amnesty 
The legal reforms outlined above focus on bringing Kazakh law into compliance with 
international laws governing the processing of the proceeds of crime. As discussed 
previously, however, this approach focuses attention onto one element of a much 
wider problem, and by imposing criminal controls onto the processing of illegally-
acquired finances, validates the security and integrity of the national economic 
system by excluding illegitimate finance, thus facilitating investment (Alldridge 2008: 
448-450). This is a market-constituting effect, in that it enforces the boundaries of the 
marketplace and the limits of acceptable commercial conduct, protecting other 
market actors (Braithwaite 2008). One of the problems with this approach is that it is 
designed to exclude the proceeds of unacceptable forms of criminal conduct and so 
creates a rigid ‘firewall’ between those proceeds and the mainstream economy. But 
in a country like Kazakhstan, where a significant proportion of the economy is in 
‘shadow’, and not necessarily a result of criminal activity, this firewall has the effect 
of limiting the ability of the state to ‘reclaim’ those assets for investment in lawful 
commercial enterprises, and thus for official declaration and taxation. If the predicate 
conduct giving rise to the proceeds is not itself a serious criminal matter, then 
criminalising the subsequent use of those proceeds significantly widens the criminal 
law into an area where the putative benefits of control are much harder to 
demonstrate (Alldridge 2008: 451). As such, there is a case to be made for the 
development of state responses that better facilitate the reclamation of illicit assets, 
and thus economic development processes. 
While most countries of the former Soviet Union experienced very high levels of illicit 
capital accumulation during the initial period of independence, most have 
subsequently treated those existing illicit funds with relative indifference, legislating 
in relation to future laundering activities while leaving the bulk of the illicit economy 
intact, and often choosing to ‘adopt but not enforce’ anti-money laundering laws 
(Tang and Ai 2010). There is rarely any focused strategic plan put in place to 
legitimize these funds. In this regard, however, Kazakhstan is somewhat different 
from its neighbours as it has pursued a dual approach, both criminalising money 
laundering (as above) and facilitating the legalisation of funds by declaring two 
amnesties allowing for the voluntary declaration of illicit proceeds, in 2001 and again 
in 2006-2007. At this point in time Kazakhstan, like many other developing countries, 
was experiencing a lack of investment funds to facilitate the development of its 
economic infrastructure; there was a clear economic benefit to be gained from 
bringing a proportion of the shadow economy into the mainstream by making 
‘opponents’ free to invest in legitimate fields. At the same time, the state lacked the 
capacity to make a significant dent in the existing problem of the illegitimate 
economy via a criminal enforcement approach; an amnesty represented an 
approach which would bypass the limitations of law enforcement.  
Thus, on 2 April 2001 an Act entitled ‘Amnesty for the Citizens of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in connection with the laundering of money’ was adopted into law, 
allowing for the exclusive one-time legalization of assets that were previously 
withdrawn from legal economic circulation and had not been declared for tax 
purposes, and which resulted from the perpetration of certain economic offenses. 
The Act proscribed a thirty-day period during which such funds could be transferred 
without the proper dispositions into special accounts held by second-tier banks, 
meaning that any deposits would be safeguarded by the banking sector’s system of 
collective guarantee. Although the Act stipulated that the amnesty did not apply to 
the legalization of money derived from corruption offences, or offences against either 
the person, the constitution, national security, private property, public order, or public 
health and morals, as well as money belonging to others or received as loans, the 
reality was that the state had little capacity to effectively determine the origins of the 
money being legalized. And although this initial amnesty period was extended for a 
short while, the process did not bring significant inflows of funds into the national 
economy; approximately 70.5 billion KZT was leveraged (approximately $480 million 
USD), of which 88.5% took the form of cash receipts (82% in US dollars) and 11% 
($50.5 million USD) non-cash deposit transfers from accounts held in foreign banks. 
The maximum individual amount legalized was $800,000 USD cash, and the 
average deposit size was $164,000 USD; some 70% of legalized assets were 
subsequently left on deposit in the banking system.6 
Despite the limits of this first effort at legalization, it was deemed sufficiently 
successful to justify a second amnesty period, which would apply (unlike the first) to 
all property and assets held by individuals and legal entities, not just to money. An 
Act entitled ‘Amnesty in connection with the legalization of property’ was passed into 
law on July 5, 2006, intended to allow for the legalization of property derived from the 
commission of certain crimes and administrative offenses under the laws of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. This amnesty, which lasted for a longer period than the first 
one, led to the legalization of property totalling 828 billion KZT ($6.79 billion USD) in 
value, including cash to the value of 536 billion KZT ($4.4 billion USD). To 
contextualise, the equivalent of 8.7% of Kazakhstan’s national GDP was legitimized 
via deposits made by 10% of the total population of the country. This made the 
second Kazakh amnesty highly successful by comparative standards; the most well-
known example of a previous amnesty of this sort was in Ireland in 1988, where the 
funds legitimized amounted to 2.5% of GDP. As well as the financial return 
associated with this amnesty, the process generated useful knowledge relating to the 
shadow economy and the illicit business practices that underpin it; most of the 
property legalized under the amnesties in 2001 and 2007 were acquired as a result 
of business corruption.7 
Conclusions 
The notion of ‘amnesty’ is compatible with a conception of money laundering that 
views the wrongfulness of the act as residing in remote economic harms that accrue 
to the financial system, rather than as a form of complicity in the predicate offence 
that generated the money (Alldridge 2008: 457). Such a conception reflects the 
approach originally taken in international money laundering circles. Seeing the harm 
caused by laundering in economic terms means that it is notionally possible, 
therefore, to measure that harm against a countervailing economic benefit, and 
determine that the legalization of illicit capital might produce benefits that outweigh 
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those harms, and thus present a preferable option. For a country like Kazakhstan, 
this allowed for the recovery of significant funds to assist in the development of the 
legitimate economy. These funds bring back into mainstream circulation assets that 
would otherwise remain unusable, much of which passed into the hands of their 
current owners during the transition to independence. Amnesties thus contribute to 
the market-constituting aims of money laundering regimes, in that they expand the 
regulated space within which commerce can occur (Braithwaite 2008). Of course, the 
proposition that amnesties on the laundering of illicit money can be desirable must 
not be interpreted as an argument in favour of removing criminal law prohibitions on 
money laundering entirely; the need to enforce against recognised predicate 
offences, particularly those relating to serious and organised crime, requires that 
national legal systems have effective criminal offences, backed up with appropriately 
stringent monitoring systems. But the application of these measures in the context of 
a transitional state can entrench existing problems, maintaining the division between 
legitimate and illegitimate economies.  
As such, there is a need to look beyond the crime control rationale to determine 
whether there are illegitimate assets within the shadow economy that merit recovery; 
funds that accrue from untaxed or informal work, proceeds acquired during the early 
days of independence, or assets deriving from unregulated or unofficial commerce, 
can all be constructively used within the legitimate economy. These forms of 
illegitimate property do not have the connection to an underlying serious predicate 
offence that would merit criminalisation according to the ‘crime control’ rationale. As 
such, it is harder to justify the blanket criminalisation of those resources. It is clear 
that Kazakhstan’s desire to encourage inward investment and economic growth 
requires it to demonstrate that it has a robust financial system and takes active steps 
to prevent the permeation of the economy by organised crime. But there are also 
untapped funds within its borders, many of which remain inaccessible once anti-
money laundering controls are put in place. These assets distort formal 
understandings of the state of the economy, and can lead to the pursuit of policy 
choices that are less than optimal. Kazakhstan’s experience of an amnesty on the 
legalization of illegally acquired capital was that the shadow economy was 
weakened, there was a significant increase in investment in legitimate businesses, 
and the revenue that the state obtained from them was increased. Temporary 
amnesties can facilitate the constitution of the marketplace which anti-money 
laundering laws seek to protect, and used properly, can be a valuable policy choice 
for developing nations. 
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